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5.1  Introduction 
One of the most important puzzles of economic development is the postwar 
failure of Latin American economic growth in comparison with the dramatic 
growth in East Asia. Table  5.1 shows the per capita growth performance of 
several key  countries in each region for the extended period from  1870 to 
1990. The table highlights a striking fact: the relative growth performance of 
the two regions in the most recent period, 1960-90, is the reverse of the relative 
growth performance in  the preceding period,  1870-1960.  Even  the recent 
Asian financial crisis is unlikely to reverse the long-term difference in growth 
since 1960. The reversal in relative growth performance over the course of  a 
century should caution us immediately against simplistic theories ascribing 
Asia’s successes, or Latin America’s failures, to ostensibly stable social charac- 
teristics such as family structure, attitudes toward education, social trust, reli- 
gion, or attitudes toward authority, which are frequently invoked to explain the 
differential growth performance of the two regions (though less so since Asia’s 
financial crisis exploded in 1997!). 
There is little doubt that much of the explanation of differential long-term 
performance lies in differing economic policies in the two regions, especially 
policies regarding international trade (see Sachs and Warner 1995a for a brief 
historical overview of trade policies, and Bulmer-Thomas 1994 for a compre- 
hensive survey of  Latin America). In  the period  1870-1910,  most of  Latin 
America operated under a liberal trade regime that aimed to foster export-led 
growth of primary products. Argentina benefited enormously from export-led 
growth in grains and meat products; Chile enjoyed a boom in nitrates and cop- 
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Table 5.1  Annual GDP Growth Per Capita, 1870-1990: Regions and 
Selected Countries 

































Source: Maddison (1995, app. D). 
“913 rather than 1910. 
per; Bolivia grew on the basis of tin and silver; Brazil exported coffee and 
rubber; and so on. Northeast Asian countries such as Korea and Taiwan had 
few natural resources to support a comparable export boom. In the recent pe- 
riod, by  contrast, much of Asia pursued open trade policies and export-led 
growth based on labor-intensive manufactures, while most of Latin America 
pursued relatively closed trade policies, with attempts at import-substituting 
industrialization.’ In the postwar era, much of Latin America began to open to 
international trade only in the 1980s, after the failure of the import substitution 
strategy. Thus we can say that in both periods, rapid GDP growth was favored 
by open trade and  export-led growth. The failures of Asian economies that 
were closed to trade in the recent period (North Korea, Vietnam until 1989, 
Myanmar, India until 1991) underscore the basic fact that growth has depended 
not merely on geography but on the trade (and other) policies pursued by the 
individual countries. Similarly, Chile was the first Latin American country to 
liberalize trade in the recent period, and its recent growth success demonstrates 
the possibility of  export-led growth in Latin America. 
It is easy, nonetheless, to fall into the trap of ascribing all of the difference 
in economic performance to economic policies. The purpose of this paper is 
to consider again the role that economic structure has also played in the relative 
growth performance of the two regions. In the late nineteenth century, abun- 
dant natural resources were the key to rapid growth in peripheral countries. 
Primary commodity export-led growth in countries such as Argentina was aug- 
1. The precise nature of the trade regimes in East Asia remains a matter of dispute. Some econo- 
mies, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, were almost completely free trade economies. Others, 
particularly several Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, were 
moderately protective for final consumer goods, but nearly free trade for both capital goods and 
inputs used by exporters (e.g., through mechanisms such as export-processing zones). The north- 
east Asian economies of  Korea and Taiwan were probably even more protective, on average, of 
final goods markets but similarly provided a regime of “(nearly) free trade for exporters” through 
duty drawbacks, tax exemptions, tax holidays, export-processing zones, and other related mecha- 
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Fig. 5.1 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Inrernafional Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., vari- 
ous issues). 
Commodity price index versus industrial country export unit value, 
1957-94 
mented by rapid capital inflows from the advanced economies to build railways 
and other infrastructure in support of the export sector (see Bulmer-Thomas 
1994, 102-8,  for data on foreign direct investment and railway construction). 
In the past three decades, it has been the export of  labor-intensive manufac- 
tures-especially  apparel and electronics-rather  than primary commodities 
that has played the key role in spurring developing country growth.* On one 
important issue Raul Prebisch seems to have been mostly right: primary com- 
modities were not an effective base for sustained, long-term high growth in the 
postwar era (see his famous analysis of  Latin American development, pub- 
lished as United Nations 1950). There appear to be two main reasons. First, 
the terms of trade have indeed tended to move against primary commodities 
over the postwar period, as Prebisch forecasted. Figure 5.1 shows the prices of 
nonoil commodities and petroleum relative to the unit export values of  the 
industrial countries. The relative prices of both nonoil commodities and oil fell 
sharply between 1957 and  1994, by around 40 percent in the case of  nonoil 
commodities and 24 percent in the case of oil. Second, productivity increases 
in manufacturing have outstripped productivity increases in primary produc- 
2. The electronics sector in East Asia began with assembly operations  (e.g., semiconductor 
assembly), using low-skilled labor and often in export-processing zones. As a result of increased 
investments, learning, technology transfer, and upgraded skills in East Asian economies, produc- 
tion shifted from assembly to high-technology operations (e.g.. wafer fabrication) and production 
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tion and in services. This is shown, for example, in Chenery, Robinson, and 
Syrquin (1986), and in Young (1995) in the case of East Asia. Prebisch’s  seri- 
ous miscalculations were twofold: first, his belief that manufacturing sector 
growth could be sustained on the basis of internal demand via import substitu- 
tion and, second, his neglect of the possibility that developing countries could 
achieve export-led growth in manufactures. The recent path to success has in 
fact been to hitch growth to the export of labor-intensive manufactures, rather 
than to the substitution of capital-intensive manufacturing imports. 
Note that the two factors-the  terms-of-trade decline of primary commodi- 
ties and relatively low productivity growth in the primary sector-are  probably 
the reverse of the pattern at the end of  the nineteenth century. In the earlier 
period,  enormous advances in  railways, ocean transport, refrigeration, and 
packaging, as well as the rapid industrialization underway in Europe and the 
United States, gave a boost to the international terms of trade of primary pro- 
ducers, albeit one punctuated by  periodic short-term crises. Moreover, there 
were rapid technological advances possible through the introduction of  new 
agricultural and mining techniques. We  might also note in passing that in the 
future, technological changes in information processing and communications 
might once again alter the basis for the economic integration of developing 
countries into the world economy. Rather than export-led growth in primary 
commodities or labor-intensive manufactures, the next phase of development 
might favor export-led growth in the service sectors of the economy. 
The theme of this paper is that economic structure, in addition to economic 
policy, has affected the capacity of countries to enjoy manufacturing export- 
led growth in the past 30 years, and even to avoid the kind of short-run macro- 
economic crises that have plagued much of Latin America. In particular, East 
Asia’s  disadvantage at the end of  the nineteenth century-the  (relative) ab- 
sence of  land and natural resources-has  been its advantage  in  the recent 
phase of the world economy. The striking difference in resource endowments 
in the two regions is shown in figure 5.2, where we show the population densi- 
ties for eight East Asian and six Latin American countries. The Asian countries 
are all more densely populated than their Latin counterparts, typically by  a 
very wide margin. Of course, land endowment is just one aspect of the differ- 
ences between the regions: Latin America is also mineral rich, while much of 
East Asia (particularly northeast Asia) is mineral poor. 
Broadly speaking, trade patterns match the resource endowments: the labor- 
abundant developing economies of East Asia have tended to export manufac- 
tures, while the land- and resource-abundant developing economies of  Latin 
America have tended to export agricultural and mining products. Some striking 
evidence in support of  this proposition is found in figure 5.3, adapted from 
Wood and Berge (1997). On the x-axis is a measure of relative factor endow- 
ments, years of schooling divided by land area, and on the y-axis is the ratio of 
manufactures exports to primary exports. The plot confirms that countries tend 
to export goods that are intensive in their abundant factors of production. In "  HK  SING  KOR  VET  CHI THAI INDO MAL  MM  VEN  BRA  CHIL  PER  ARC 
mSSAfrica 
Fig. 5.2  Population density (per square kilometer) 
Source: World Bank, World*Data. 138  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 5.2  Structure of Exports by Main Category (percent of total) 
1970  1992 
Region  Primary.  Manufacturesb  Primw  Manufacturesb 
Americas 
Chile 
89.4  10.6  64.2  35.8 
95.1  4.3  833  16.5’ 
South and Southeast 
Asia  56.6  43.5  19.5  80.5 
China  52.5  47.5  19.4  80.6 
Source: United Nations (1995). 
”Primary  products include all food items, agricultural raw materials, fuels, ores, and metals. 
bManufactured products include SITC categories 5-8,  except for 68. 
c1993. 
particular, labor-abundant economies tend to export manufactures, while land- 
abundant economies (Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa) tend to export 
natural resources. Table 5.2 shows that Latin American exports remain heavily 
based in natural resources, while Asia is predominantly a manufacturing ex- 
porter. 
It is very likely that Latin America’s low share of manufactured exports is a 
function not only of resource endowments but also of restricted trade practices. 
Manufacturing exports require, in general, access to imported primary and in- 
termediate inputs and capital machinery at, or close to, world prices. Latin 
America’s import substitution policies until the past decade certainly limited 
the scope for manufactured exports. For example, Morawetz’s (1981) excellent 
study of  Colombian apparel exports showed that Colombian manufacturers 
were severely hampered by the lack of access to necessary inputs, especially 
textiles, at world prices, because of a protective trade regime and inefficient 
administrative support for would-be exporters. On top of that, however, Mora- 
wetz shows that Colombia’s coffee boom in the late 1970s also contributed to 
a real appreciation of the currency and a resulting profit squeeze in the fledg- 
ling textile and apparel export sector-the  kind of phenomenon stressed in 
this paper. It is notable that Chile, after almost 20 years of open trade, is still 
predominantly a resource-based exporter rather than a manufacturing exporter. 
In 1993, the share of manufactures in total merchandise exports came to only 
16.5 percent, as seen in table 5.2. Our focus in this paper is on the role of 
resource endowments, rather than trade policy, though a complete theoretical 
and empirical treatment will require the incorporation of both considerations. 
The World Bank (1996a) has recently produced calculations on national 
wealth that underscore the differences in resource endowments by region. On 
the World Bank’s methodology, national wealth is divided among human re- 
sources (human capital), produced assets (plant, equipment, structures, and in- 
ventories), and natural capital (land, minerals, etc.). As seen in table 5.3, the 
Asian regions (India and China, East Asia and Pacific) have very high propor- 139  Resource Endowments and the Real Exchange Rate 
Table 5.3  Economic Growth and Sources of Wealth 
Per Capita  Share in Total Wealth 
GDP Growth,  Per Capita 
1985-94  GDP, 1994  Human  Produced  Natural 
Region  (annual)  (U.S.$)  Resources  Assets  Capital 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -  1.2  460  31  17  52 
India and China  5.7  439  73  18  9 
East Asia and 
Pacific (except 
China)  4.9  860  75  13  12 
Latin America and 
Caribbean  0.6  3,340  50  15  35 
Middle East and 
North Africa  -0.4  1,580  39  29  32 
Sources: Annual growth rates and per capita GDP are from World Bank (1996b, table 1, basic indicators). 
Note that regional GDP growth rates and levels are based on population weights. Sources of wealth are 
from World Bank (1996a). 
tions of wealth in human resources and low proportions of  wealth in natural 
capital (below 15 percent). Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Carib- 
bean, and Middle East and North Africa, by contrast, have much higher propor- 
tions of  wealth (over 30 percent) in natural capital. We  also see, once again, 
that resource endowments are at least loosely correlated with growth perfor- 
mance: the regions with a high share of natural capital endowment are also the 
regions with a low or negative rate of per capita GDP growth during 1985-94. 
To summarize the argument of the paper, it seems that the Dutch disease is 
a disease after all, both with regard to long-term growth rates and short-term 
macroeconomic crises. As shown in a sample of  more than 90 developing 
countries in Sachs and Warner (1  995b), natural-resource-abundant economies 
tended to grow less rapidly than natural-resource-scarce economies in the pe- 
riod since 1970. Many factors probably contribute to this pattern, including 
political as well as economic factors. This paper discusses one major channel: 
the linkages from natural resources via the real exchange rate to long-term 
growth. Resource-rich and resource-poor economies differ markedly in the 
patterns of real exchange rate levels and changes, as well as in the linkages of 
the real exchange rate to income distribution and growth. The differing links of 
the real exchange rate to income distribution affect short-run macroeconomic 
management in the two regions. 
Section 5.2 introduces an extremely simple baseline model of an economy 
with three sectors: natural resources, manufacturing tradables, and nontraded 
goods. Using this simple model, we trace the effects of four variables on the 
real exchange rate, income distribution, and growth: capital accumulation, cap- 
ital inflows, currency devaluation, and skill accumulation. Resource-rich and 
resource-poor economies differ markedly in their adjustment patterns, and it 
is easy to illustrate how resource-abundant economies can get stuck in a no- 140  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
growth trap while resource-poor economies achieve rapid growth. In section 
5.3 we then turn our attention to an empirical comparison of  East Asia and 
Latin America, to assess the relevance of resource endowments versus alterna- 
tive factors in recent economic performance. 
5.2  A Basic Theoretical Model 
Let us introduce an extremely simple framework to highlight the forces at 
play.3 Suppose that there are just three goods: a natural resource R whose out- 
put is exogenous at R,; a labor-intensive traded manufacturing good M, with 
production linear in labor input LM;  and a capital-intensive, nontraded output 
N,  which uses labor L,,  a sector-specific capital K,,  and an internationally trad- 
able input TN  in a constant-returns-to-scale  production technology. (It would 
be straightforward to introduce more general neoclassical production functions 
without altering the main themes of the paper.) We  assume that the domestic 
resource sector uses no domestic inputs (and we define the output R as net of 
any tradable inputs). Thus: 
R  = R,, 
For simplicity, we assume that LN  and KN are combined according to Cobb- 
Douglas technology to produce value added V,,  which is then combined with 
the intermediate input in  fixed proportions to produce gross output. In par- 
ticular, 
N  = min[(L,)"(K,)'-",  T/Xl. 
This implies that the price of output in sector N can be written as a weighted 
sum of the value-added deflator P$ and the price of tradables, which we take 
to be numkraire: 
3. Of course, many theoretical treatments are available that highlight some of the phenomena at 
play. The important paper by Anne Krueger (1977) models an economy with a natural resource 
sector (using land and labor) and a multiindustry manufacturing sector, in which each of the manu- 
facturing industries uses capital and labor in a neoclassical production function, but with varying 
degrees of capital intensity. A large natural resource sector leaves less labor for the manufacturing 
sector, and thus a higher capital-labor ratio in the sector. As a result, a natural-resource-abundant 
economy is more likely to produce capital-intensive manufactures (if it produces manufactures at 
all) and less likely to produce labor-intensive manufactures. The small size or absence of labor- 
intensive manufacturing industries is the major theme of the Dutch disease literature, and of this 
paper. Alan Deardorff (1984) extends the Krueger model to consider the role of trade protection. 
Edward Leamer (1987) offers a graphical account of a three-factor (capital, land, labor), multisec- 
tor Heckscher-Ohlin model to show how resource abundance affects the sectoral allocation of 
productive factors and the economy-wide pattern of trade. Neither the Krueger nor Leamer model 
includes nontradable goods production. 141  Resource Endowments and the Real Exchange Rate 
(3) 
All consumers have identical tastes, which for simplicity we take to be Cobb- 
Douglas. A constant fraction p of  income is spent on tradable goods, which 
we  take  as  numhraire,  and  the  remainder  is  spent  on  nontradable goods 
P,  = P;  + x. 
(1 -  P). 
(4)  c;,  = 
GC;, = 1 - p. 
Note that the consumer price index is simply 
(5) 
since the price of tradables is one. 
The trade deficit equals final consumption of tradables, C,,  minus total pro- 
duction of tradables net of intermediate inputs of tradables. The trade deficit 
equals the net resource transfer NRT, which we take to be exogenous and gen- 
erally set equal to zero: 
p, = pLpy = P’-B 
(6)  NRT  = C, - (R + M - T). 
In addition, nontraded consumption must equal nontraded production: 
(7)  C,  = N. 
Finally, full employment requires 
(8) 
The labor supply is normalized to equal one, so that L,  and LN signify the 
shares of labor allocated to each sector. We assume that the labor force is com- 
petitive, so that workers are paid their marginal value products. The marginal 
value product in nontradables is P,@N/dL,),  so that the wage is given by 
(9)  W = P,”(dNIdL,). 
The  marginal value  product  of  workers  in  manufacturing is  simply 8.  If 
W > 8, then wages are too high for the country to be competitive in manufac- 
turing (barring trade barriers), and L,  = 0. Alternatively, if W = 8, then both 
L, and L, are positive. The wage can never be less than 8 since manufacturing 
firms have an unlimited demand for workers at the wage 8. 
When R is large enough, L, will equal zero. The economy relies entirely on 
its natural resource exports to cover its consumption demand for tradables as 
well as the derived demand for traded intermediate inputs into nontradable 
production. As stylized descriptions, we refer to the case of specialization in 
production (M  = 0) as the “Latin American case” and the case of no specializa- 
tion as the “East Asian case.” We  will discuss the empirical realism of these 
descriptions in section 5.3. Let us underscore here, however, that these desig- 
1 = L,  + L,. 142  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
nations are obviously a caricature. Some Latin American economies, such as 
Brazil, are highly competitive in manufacturing exports, while some East 
Asian economies, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, have significant natural re- 
source endowments. Nonetheless, the labeling has broad analytical and empiri- 
cal merit. 
High R  eliminates the tradable  manufacturing sector through  the usual 
Dutch disease mechanism. High R leads to high demand in the economy, and 
in particular for nontraded goods. This high demand causes P,  to rise (com- 
pared with the case of  low R), and labor flows into the nontraded sector. As- 
suming that PN  is high enough, the entire labor force flows into nontradables, 
with the marginal value product of labor in nontradables remaining above the 
marginal value product of labor in manufacturing. Specifically, for the Latin 
American case to obtain we must have P~(&’Vlr3LNlL=l)  > 8. Note that the rela- 
tive price of tradable goods to nontradable goods-that  is, the real exchange 
rate-is  simply UP,. Therefore, a rise in PN  is a real exchange rate apprecia- 
tion, and a fall in PN  is a real exchange rate depreciation. The most common 
way to describe the Latin American case is that the large natural resource sector 
causes the real exchange rate to become so appreciated that labor-intensive 
manufactures are not profitable. 
A key point of the analysis is that real wages tend to respond oppositely to 
changes in PN  in the Latin American and East Asian cases. In the Latin Ameri- 
can case, the nontraded sector is the labor-intensive sector: a rise in P, there- 
fore raises the real wage. In the East Asian case, by contrast, the manufacturing 
sector is the labor-intensive sector: a rise in PN  therefore lowers the real wage. 
As a result of this crucial distinction, real wages-and  much else in the econ- 
omy-respond  differently to exogenous shocks in Latin America  and East 
Asia. As a result, the political economy of trade and monetary policy is also 
different. Patterns of endogenous growth may also be very different. 
Consider a numerical illustration based on the following parameter values: 
a = 0.75, 
A = 0.25, 
e  =  1.0, 
K,  = 1.0, 
p  = 0.5, 
NRT  = 0. 
In this case, the East Asian case obtains for P, 5  0.58, while the Latin Ameri- 
can case obtains for PN > 0.58. As shown in figure 5.4, in the interval (0.25, 
0.58), WIP, is a declining function of P,,  while in the range (0.58, -),  WIP, is 
a rising function of P,.  (Note that P,  must be greater than or equal to 0.25, so 
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Fig. 5.4  Real wages and the relative price of nontradables 
Events that tend to raise PN  have opposite effects on real wages in East Asia 
and Latin America. For example, a natural resource discovery can actually 
lower real wages in East Asia by  bidding up the price of  nontradable goods 
that  are purchased by  manufacturing sector workers. By  contrast, in  Latin 
America, a natural resource boom will tend to raise the real wage by pushing 
up PN  and thereby reducing the relative price that service sector workers pay 
for tradable commodities. To put it another way, imports look cheap to Latin 
urban workers during a resource boom. By contrast, housing costs look high 
to Asian manufacturing workers during a similar boom. The result is depicted 
in figure 5.5, which shows the relationship between R and WIP,. As R rises 
from low levels, the real wage decreases. Eventually (at the point where LM  = 
0), higher R starts to cause the real wage to increase. 
Capital accumulation in the nontradable sector presents a special problem 
in the Latin American case. Suppose that KN  increases in Latin America. What 
happens to the real wage? Surprisingly, as shown in figure 5.6, the real wage 
may decline, even though the marginal physical product of  labor expands. 
There are two main effects. On the one hand, W/PI  rises, because of the capital 
deepening in the nontradable sector. This of course tends to push up the real 
wage. On the other hand, the increase in nontradable production leads to a 
decline in PN  (relative to the numiraire good, tradable manufactures). This 
leads to a more than proportionate decline in PL, which is equal to P, -  A A  0.7 
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(note that the proportionate decline in Pi  is larger the larger is A). The decline 
in Pi  lowers the marginal value product of labor in nontradables and thus tends 
to reduce the real wage. While the overall effect is ambiguous, it is certainly 
possible that capital accumulation lowers, rather than raises, the real wage. 
In fact, the real wage might continue to decline with capital accumulation in 
nontradables until the wage is so low that the country becomes competitive in 
tradable manufactures. At that point, the country shifts from the Latin Ameri- 
can to the East Asian case. 
Consider a country like Venezuela, for example, which lives off a fixed flow 
of oil export earnings and has virtually no other exports. An improvement in 
nontradable infrastructure (e.g., financed by  the government out of oil reve- 
nues) could actually lower real wages by  forcing a real depreciation of  the 
exchange rate. The problem would be interpreted by  the general public as a 
balance-of-payments  problem: higher nontraded production leads to increased 
demand for imports, against a backdrop of  constant export supply. The real 
exchange rate therefore tends to depreciate (abstracting from short-run foreign 
borrowing). The real exchange rate depreciation, in turn, pushes up import 
costs and can lower the real wage (especially if the import component in non- 
tradable production, A, is large). 
Notice what would happen as growth continues in the nontraded goods sec- 
tor, pushing PN  and WIP, still lower. Eventually the real exchange rate depreci- 
ates enough that  the nominal wage falls to the level 8. It finally becomes 
profitable to produce labor-intensive exports in the country, and the economy 
enters the  “East Asian  region,”  with positive production of  labor-intensive 
manufactured goods. For a country like Venezuela, with a large but fairly fixed 
stock of natural resources, the time path of the real wage may therefore be U- 
shaped. High oil revenues at the start give a high level of the real wage. Over 
time, as capital accumulates in the nontraded sector, the real wage declines. 
Finally, the bottom is hit as the country takes on the new vocation of manufac- 
turing exporter. This basic observation may help to account for the long-term 
stagnation or even decline in real wages in much of Latin America in the past 
20 years. Stagnantprimary exports have led to a prolonged slide in real wages, 
until  these economies finally  achieve  competitiveness  in  manufacturing ex- 
ports. 
If accumulation of KN  can lower the real wage in the Latin American case, 
does accumulation of  capital in tradables tend to lower the real wage in the 
East Asian case?4  The answer is no: the cases are not perfectly symmetrical. 
Latin America cannot easily raise export production since R  is fixed, while 
East Asia can readily raise nontradable production through increased employ- 
ment and capital in the sector. Therefore, a rise in capital in the tradable sector 
in Asia does not tend to lead to a sharp rise in the relative price of nontradables, 
4.  Note that we do not formally model capital accumulation in the manufacturing sector. This 
deficiency can easily be removed in an extension to the model in the paper. 146  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
as long as nontradable production can expand. The rise in productivity of labor 
due to higher K therefore tends to outweigh any adverse effects on the real 
wage due to a rise in Pw 
It is easy to see that a nominal exchange rate devaluation will tend to have 
different impacts on the real wage in the two cases. Suppose that overall de- 
mand is determined, in part, by  real money balances MIP,.  A nominal ex- 
change rate depreciation will tend to reduce real money balances (and raise 
domestic interest rates, in the case of  capital controls that isolate the home 
financial market from the rest of the world). The demand for nontradables will 
tend to fall, pushing down Pw In East Asia, the result will be higher real wages 
(experienced as increased demand for labor in manufactures as a result of the 
devaluation). In Latin America, the result will be lower real wages (experi- 
enced as higher prices for imported manufactures). We  can also note that for- 
eign borrowing will tend to raise real wages in Latin America in the short run 
(by supporting an appreciated real exchange rate), while lowering real wages 
in East Asia. Of course, debts eventually come due and typically require a real 
exchange rate depreciation in order to pay them off. In Latin America, debt 
servicing therefore tends to require a sharp fall in real wages, while in East 
Asia, debt servicing may well be accompanied by an increase in real wages. 
If  we  put  these pieces  together-a  long-term slide in  real  wages  of  a 
commodity-rich economy, with short-run real wage movements depending on 
the nominal exchange rate and foreign borrowing-we  can see the outlines of 
a political economy interpretation of macroeconomic crises in Latin America. 
For countries like Venezuela that are experiencing a long-term decline in real 
wages, overvalued nominal exchange rates and heavy foreign borrowing give 
a way to halt the slide of the real wage temporarily. Of course these are destruc- 
tive palliatives in the longer term, but palliatives nonetheless. The deeper un- 
derlying problem is that export-led growth is blocked by an initially overstrong 
exchange rate, which undermines the competitiveness of  manufacturing ex- 
ports. 
Perhaps the most interesting differences in economic performance relate to 
long-term growth. We have already referred to evidence in Sachs and Warner 
(1  995b)  indicating  that  resource-poor  countries  have  fared  better  than 
resource-rich countries in  economic growth over the period  1970-89,  after 
controlling for other variables typically associated with growth, such as initial 
per capita income, trade policy, and national saving rate. Matsuyama (1992) 
offered a small endogenous growth model that could account for this pattern. 
In Matsuyama’s model, the manufacturing sector is characterized by  learning 
by doing that is external to the enterprise but internal to the sector as a whole. 
The resource-rich country specializes in the resource sector and never benefits 
from the learning by  doing, while the resource-poor country specializes in 
manufacturing and begins automatically to enjoy productivity growth in that 
sector. The productivity growth, in turn, widens the comparative advantage 
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ing the initial trade patterns. The resource-abundant economy is more firmly 
locked into the export of natural resources and the import of manufactures, all 
with a stagnant economy, while the resource-poor country enjoys long-term 
growth based on learning by doing in manufactures. 
The following (sketch of a) model extends Matsuyama’s framework to allow 
for a nontraded goods sector, while relaxing the assumption of  learning by 
doing that  is external to the firm.  The latter extension is worthwhile since 
recent empirical evidence (e.g., Young  1995) casts some doubt on the role of 
pure technical change in Asia’s rapid growth in the past 30 years. Empirical 
evidence suggests that productivity growth is indeed most rapid in manufactur- 
ing, but that the productivity growth is based on higher capital intensity and 
higher skills of workers, rather than on dynamic external economies of  scale 
or learning by doing. We therefore suggest a simple model that is compatible 
with these observations. 
Suppose that there are overlapping generations of workers, with each gener- 
ation a constant population size equal to one. Individuals live for two periods. 
Total population at any time is therefore two, with half old and half young. All 
workers are born unskilled and work as unskilled laborers in the first period. 
Workers in the first period may acquire education in order to become skilled 
workers in the second generation (thus being “educated” and being “skilled” 
are synonymous in this model). For simplicity, we assume that education is 
pursued in addition to first-period work (e.g., in night school). The skills ob- 
tained in education augment the productivity of workers in the production of 
traded manufactures M, but not in the production of nontraded final goods N. 
Young workers choose whether or not to pursue an education depending on 
the monetary returns to being educated in the second period. There are four 
sectors in the economy: natural resources, traded manufactures, education, and 
nontraded final goods. 
The education process uses an input of u  < 1 units of an older skilled worker 
to convert one unskilled worker into a skilled worker. The level of skill of the 
worker can be measured by the productivity of the worker in the production of 
manufactures. An unskilled worker has a constant marginal productivity equal 
to  Ow, while a skilled worker in period t has productivity equal to 0;  > Ou. 
Skilled workers are divided between work  in manufacturing LM and  work 
in teaching 4.  At the maximum, the demand for teachers is given by 4 = 
u  < 1, in the case where the entire younger generation enrolls in schooling. In 
the equilibria that we examine, all younger workers either enroll in education 
or all forgo education. Therefore, in equilibria in which education is pursued, 
the entire older generation is composed of skilled workers, u < 1 percent of 
the old workers are teachers, and 1 -  u > 0 percent are manufacturing work- 
ers. Since the wage of manufacturing workers is equal to Os, competitive labor 
markets will ensure that the wage of teachers is also 0:. 
The next assumption is critical. We assume tRat  the future productivity of 
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t. Specifically, with O;+,  the future productivity of today’s students and 0;  the 
productivity of today’s teachers, we posit 
In this way, each generation is better trained than the previous generation, re- 
sulting in sustained, endogenous growth.’ Consider, now, the choice of a young 
worker as to whether to pursue an education. Since education makes sense 
only to join the manufacturing labor force (since nontraded goods do not use 
skilled labor), the young worker must look to the future skilled wage in manu- 
facturing. The future wage with an education is therefore e;,,.  Denote the fu- 
ture unskilled wage as  W:,.  Workers choose an education if  the discounted 
wage advantage of being educated exceeds the direct costs of an education: 
(12)  If  (€Is+, - W:,)/(l  + S)  > u0s, thenchooseeducation; 
if  (0;+, - W:,)/(l  + S)  < ue;, then choose no education. 
Now,  let us consider the differing dynamics of  Latin American-type  and 
East Asian-type  economies. Suppose that both economies begin with a young 
generation of  unskilled workers and an older generation of  skilled workers 
with initial skills 07. Consider first the Latin American case. As usual, the Latin 
American-type  economy has a large constant flow of  earnings of  R, which 
pushes up the unskilled wage in services. Indeed, it can easily be the case that 
W, > (1 + ~)0:  > 07,  so that unskilled workers in services today earn more 
money  than both  skilled  manufacturing workers  today,  07,  and  even  more 
skilled workers tomorrow, (1 + p)07. In this case, today’s skilled workers will 
work in the service sector rather than in manufacturing or teaching, and today S 
young have no market incentive to pursue an education, since they know that 
they will earn more as unskilled workers in services than as skilled workers in 
manufacturing in the next period. As a result, the economy specializes in non- 
traded final goods, with no manufactures or education. The economy remains 
stagnant over time. 
Now consider the East Asian case. With R small or zero, W,  is less than the 
wage of skilled workers in manufacturing. The older skilled workers therefore 
all work in manufacturing or education. Young unskilled workers may be di- 
vided between manufactures and the nontraded final goods sector, or they may 
work entirely in the nontraded sector, depending on parameter values of  the 
economy. As long as the first condition in equation (12) holds, all young un- 
skilled workers choose to become educated, and the skill level of the skilled 
workers rises in the next generation. Equation (12) continues to hold each pe- 
riod, so that in each period the young generation becomes educated and yet 
5. Notice that in a growth-accounting framework, the endogenous growth would not show up 
as rapid growth in total factor productivity in manufacturing, but rather as a rapid improvement in 
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more skilled, since each new generation is trained by  more skilled teachers 
than the previous generation. Sooner or later, all unskilled workers work in the 
nontraded goods sector. The volume and world market value of traded manu- 
facturing production grows at the rate F, while the value of nontraded sector 
production, P,N, remains a fixed fraction of the traded goods sector and thus 
also grows at the same rate (though employment and physical production re- 
main unchanged in the nontraded goods sector). 
Why do the two economies diverge after they have reached identical levels 
of per capita GDP? This divergence results from the composition of GDP. In 
East Asia, GDP is composed heavily of human capital, rather than natural re- 
sources, and the returns to the continued accumulation of human capital are 
high. In the Latin American-type  economy, human capital is low, and the re- 
turns to human capital accumulation are also low. Schooling is not very effec- 
tive, partly because the quality of teaching is also low. The Latin American- 
type economy ends in a low-level-income trap. One way out of the trap is clear. 
If Latin America could generate a sufficient accumulation of human capital- 
for example, through a temporary subsidization of education for one or more 
generations-then  skilled workers would work in manufacturing rather than 
in nontraded production, and the incentive for further investment in manufac- 
turing skills would also be enhanced. The intergenerational equity and effi- 
ciency properties of  alternative subsidization schemes are yet to be investi- 
gated. 
The next step of the theoretical argument should be to expand the model to 
allow for capital accumulation, including foreign-financed capital, in the trad- 
able manufacturing sector. Arguments analogous to the case of education can 
be established: the strong real exchange rate of resource-abundant economies 
will tend to crowd out capital accumulation in labor-intensive manufactures. 
Resource scarcity, on the other hand, will favor rapid capital accumulation and 
the inflow of  capital from abroad. An  additional important step would be to 
consider the interaction between resource abundance and trade policy. For a 
resource-rich economy, even moderate levels of protection could be sufficient 
to eliminate the profitability of manufacturing exports, while for a resource- 
poor economy, manufacturing exports might remain profitable even in the face 
of moderate import protection. It is at least suggestive that when resource-rich 
Malaysia embarked on manufacturing exports in the early 1970s, it relied on 
free trade for exporters (i.e., access to all imported inputs and capital goods 
free of tariffs) through the introduction of  special export-processing zones, 
especially for the electronics sector. Even moderate protection might have been 
enough to frustrate the start-up of manufacturing exports. 
5.3  Empirical Evidence 
As shown in Sachs and Warner (1995b), a standard growth equation, includ- 
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confirms the role of  structural variables in helping to account for differential 
growth patterns. Whether we proxy the resource base by population density, 
the ratio of manufactures exports to total exports, or the ratio of resource-based 
exports to GDP, we  find that resource-abundant economies have tended to 
grow less rapidly than resource-scarce economies. Of  course, other variables 
also played a role in determining cross-country growth, especially initial in- 
comes, trade policies, and fiscal policies. What is especially notable in examin- 
ing the high growth performance in East Asia is the crucial role of manufactur- 
ing exports, especially textiles and apparel in  the early stage of  export-led 
growth and electronics at a later stage. Only two countries in the world with 
populations in excess of one million have sustained rapid growth during the 
past decade without a heavy reliance on the growth of manufacturing exports.6 
Interestingly, growth patterns within East Asia also support the general view 
that structural factors have contributed to long-term growth performance. The 
fastest growing countries (annual per capita GDP growth) in the region during 
1970-89-South  Korea (6.8), Taiwan (6.6), Hong Kong (6. l), and Singapore 
(6.8)-are  also the countries with the smallest per capita endowments of land 
and natural resources. The resource-abundant economies-Indonesia  (4.9), 
Malaysia (4.1), and Thailand (4.0)-have  had slower, though still very high, 
long-term  economic  growth.  Moreover,  it  appears  that  for  the  resource- 
abundant countries, very rapid sustained growth emerged in the mid-l980s, 
approximately one decade after the first group, and only when the latter coun- 
tries embarked on a boom in labor-intensive manufacturing exports. 
Table 5.3 provides some further support for the real exchange channel link- 
ing resource endowments to growth. For the year 1970, around the start of the 
rapid growth phase in East Asia, we calculate the ratio of a country’s nominal 
GDP in U.S.  dollars (measured  at the market exchange rate) to its GDP in U.S. 
dollars at purchasing power parity, GDP$US/GDP$US~PPp,  and denote this ratio as 
IIi for country i. When lTi is high, domestic prices in the country, converted to 
U.S. dollars, are above world dollar price levels. If tradable goods prices are 
approximately equal across countries, and if overall prices are a weighted aver- 
age of tradable and nontradable prices, then a high ratio will indicate a high 
relative price of nontradable goods. The theoretical observations of section 5.2 
suggest that resource-rich economies should have a high relative price of non- 
tradable goods, and thus a high value of  IIi. Considering a sample of  East 
Asian and Latin American countries, we indeed find that the labor-abundant 
economies tended to have  lower domestic price levels than  the  resource- 
abundant  economies. This is  true  not  only  between East  Asia  and  Latin 
6. World Bank (1996b, 188-89,  table 1) lists 11 countries with per capita GDP growth during 
1985-94 in excess of 5 percent per annum: Botswana, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ire- 
land, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, and Thailand. Botswana and Chile remain substan- 
tially primary commodity exporters, while the other nine have all had very rapid growth of manu- 
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America but also within East Asia (comparing resource-abundant Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand with the labor-abundant economies). 
We mention, in conclusion, that two important findings of the World Bank's 
(1993) East Asian Miracle are also consistent with the viewpoint taken here. 
First, at the start of the fast-growth phase, the East Asian economies had much 
higher primary enrollment rates than other developing countries at the same 
per capita income levels (World Bank 1993, 45, fig. 1.8). This is consistent 
with the view expressed earlier that the returns to education have been higher 
in the resource-scarce economies, since unskilled wages are not bid up by 
Dutch disease effects. It remains to check whether, on a cross-country basis, 
enrollment rates  can  indeed be  linked  to  the  natural resource base,  with 
resource-abundant economies having lower enrollment rates at given levels of 
per capita income. Second, the East Asian economies, not surprisingly, have 
tended to have a higher share of GDP originating in manufacturing than would 
be  predicted by  a  simple cross-sectional regression of  sectoral production 
shares on per capita GDP and population (World Bank 1993, 306, table 6.15). 
Once again, it remains to verify on a cross-country basis that the share of GDP 
in manufacturing is negatively related to resource abundance. 
5.4  Conclusions and Extensions 
Comparisons of economic performance across countries or regions should 
be based on three pillars, comparisons of economic policies, economic struc- 
ture, and initial (historical) conditions. Economic performance differs accord- 
ing to the policies that are pursued; the underlying economic and social struc- 
tures (including factor endowments, climate, topography, geography, cultural 
patterns); and specific historical conditions. The earliest comparative analyses 
of country performance, such as by Montesquieu, tended to put great stress on 
economic and social structures, but at least since Adam Smith, economists 
have  rightly pointed to economic policies as the centerpiece of comparative 
analysis. What should be clear, however, is that all three factors are crucial to 
an adequate comparative analysis of  economic performance. 
This paper returns to a classic theme of Latin American historiography: the 
special dependence of the region on natural resource sectors. A century ago, 
resource-based development was at the center of economic growth; in recent 
decades, resource dependence has probably contributed to underlying crises 
and stagnation. If it is true that rapid productivity growth in recent years has 
come mainly in manufactures, then countries endowed with labor and human 
capital rather than natural resources might indeed have a structural advantage 
in reaping the benefits of open trade. (The evidence also suggests, however, 
that even for resource-based economies, open trade significantly outperforms 
strategies built on closed trade, viz. Chile). The theoretical models in this paper 
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static resource-based sectors. Nonetheless, this work remains very sketchy and 
preliminary. A number of empirical hypotheses have been introduced but are 
as yet untested. For example, the specific proposition that the returns to school- 
ing have been higher in resource-scarce economies is testable. Even the basic 
linkages between resource endowments and high relative prices of nontrada- 
bles have, as yet, only been examined superficially. On the theoretical side, it 
is important to extend the analysis to include a richer production structure in 
the resource sector (e.g., explicitly modeling agriculture), capital accumulation 
and international capital movements, and various aspects of trade policy. 
It is also worth stressing, in conclusion, that the bases for long-term compar- 
ative advantage will change along with changes in technology and global re- 
source endowments. Just as Latin America’s commodity-based growth of  the 
end of the nineteenth century could not be sustained in the middle of the twen- 
tieth century, it may  be  true that the highly labor-intensive manufacturing 
growth of the second half of the twentieth century will give way to new kinds 
of export-led growth (e.g., of labor-intensive services via high-capacity inter- 
national data transmission). The study of long-term comparative advantage of 
developing countries seeking to integrate into the world economy remains a 
high priority of applied research in international economics. 
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Comment  Kazuo Ueda 
In this interesting paper, Sachs discusses the relationship between the structure 
of  an  economy, as  defined by  resource endowments, and its potential for 
growth led by productivity improvements in the manufacturing sector. He also 
seems to open the way to potentially fruitful areas of research, such as the role 
of economic structure for the determination of the effectiveness of trade poli- 
cies as a strategy for growth. 
The main discussion has three parts (presented in sections 5.2 and 5.3). In 
the first part a static general equilibrium model of  a small open economy is 
constructed and used to analyze a version of the Dutch disease problem. Spe- 
cifically, a larger endowment of natural resources, by raising income and the 
demand for nontraded goods, results in a higher relative price of  nontraded 
goods and thus in a smaller share of the manufacturing sector. Beyond a certain 
point the economy enters a “Latin American region” where there is no manu- 
facturing sector at all. 
The second part of the paper appends to the model an endogenous growth 
story whereby investment in human capital in the manufacturing sector creates 
the possibility of sustained growth. Such growth may not occur in an economy 
with a large nontraded goods sector. In such an economy real wages in the 
nontraded goods industry are too high to create an incentive for human capital 
investment for workers. Thus the Dutch disease becomes a chronic disease. 
The third component of the paper (section 5.3) is the confrontation of the 
implications of  the theoretical analysis with the data. Sachs argues that the 
model explains very well the divergent growth behaviors of  Latin American 
and East Asian economies. 
Let me make some comments on each of the three aspects of the paper. In 
the first part, some special assumptions are made to derive the strong implica- 
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tions of the model. For example, the manufacturing (= traded goods) sector is 
assumed to be more labor intensive than the nontraded goods sector. Moreover, 
it is assumed that the manufacturing sector uses only labor in the production 
process. 
A reversal of the factor intensity assumption will change some of the com- 
parative statics results. For example, it would change the relationship between 
the relative price of  nontraded goods and real wages. This is serious because 
many of  the results of the paper turn on real wages being relatively higher in 
Latin America. 
The relaxation of the manufacturing sector production function to include 
capital as a factor of production in the usual way  makes Latin America less 
likely to  specialize in  nontraded goods (and resources  j.  Under no-special- 
ization, real wages will be equalized between the nontraded and manufacturing 
sectors. This would make it difficult for the author to argue in the second part 
that endogenous growth will not occur due to high wages in the nontraded 
goods sector. 
The endogenous growth story based on investment in human capital in the 
manufacturing sector is neat but does not make clear why Latin America could 
not grow based on a different mechanism. 
The growth story in the paper corresponds to that of  Balassa-Samuelson. 
That is, productivity growth in the traded goods sector, by increasing income 
and, in turn, demand for nontraded goods, results in real exchange rate appreci- 
ation. The empirical evidence on this relationship between growth and the real 
exchange rate as reported by Ito, Isard, and Symansky (chap. 4 in this volume) 
is at best mixed. Japan, Taiwan, and Korea conform to the pattern. But the 
pattern does not seem to hold as clearly for other countries. 
To  summarize, the paper provides a neat and intuitively appealing story 
about why resource-poor countries performed well in the age of  export-led 
growth in manufacturing. We  are left with the feeling, however, that there 
could be  and will be  other types of  sustained growth and that  explaining 
changes in the pattern of growth will be a much harder task. 